Wayne Sussman
The Road to the South Africa Elections

Wayne Sussman | The Road to the South Africa Elections | 05.15.24

- Welcome everybody. We’ve been doing an ongoing series. I hope we’ve touched on very many aspects of what you may and may not know about South Africa as we head into our important 2024 elections, hotly contested elections, and we haven’t really got to the nub of any of this. We’ve given you a lot of context around the history of the ANC, around some of the machinations that have been going on historically, some of the stories of past presidents and their terms of office and what was mostly achieved, what was not achieved, what the major challenges in South Africa are, and just given you what I hope is a fairly good picture of where we’re at. And tonight, for the first time, we will be forecasting a little bit and looking at some of the patterns that have been going on in South African politics over the last few elections, and the best man we could find, and he is the best man anyone will find, to help us digest and understand all of this very, very complex information, because it requires an enormous amount of data, of experience, of research, and of the ability to know what to ignore, which Wayne Sussman absolutely has in bucket loads, and we’re thrilled that he managed to make time to be with all of us this evening.

So, for this special edition of Lockdown University’s series on South Africa, let me welcome again my co-host for the evening, Phumi Mashigo, and Wayne Sussman. Wayne, it’s a great pleasure to see you. How are you? Gareth, it’s really great to be speaking to you, and let me first start off by saying that I was doing a presentation today, doing a talk at lunch. People were speaking about Lockdown University last night in a totally different setting in a different part of the city. People were speaking about Lockdown University. It’s quite amazing, and I know that people have signed up from across the world what this has achieved, and it’s a privilege to make my debut at Lockdown University. So, thank you so much.

• [Phumi] Nice.

• So, Phums let’s begin, because this is not so much an interview or a lecture as it is a conversation about what’s going on in South Africa, and South Africans, we like conversations because when it’s down to polls, they very often get it wrong. Wayne, however, as I mentioned in the introduction, has been keeping an eye on our elections for a very long time, and he knows precisely where the patterns are starting to emerge. We have a number of quite different things happening in this election from all the previous ones, which we suspect may make a marked difference, but really, you’re the guy who can tell us, Wayne, and I think the best place to start is probably with the incumbents, which will bring us nicely from Monday’s show about Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, to where the ANC are at at the moment, and where you think they’re both strong, because there are parts of South Africa where they’re very, very strong, and where you think they’re weak, because there are a lot of places where they’re quite vulnerable.

• Before you start, Wayne, there’s just a note from somebody in the chat to say, please can we also use full titles? I mean, maybe I think the first time around, use the full title so that people know what we’re talking about, and then we can talk. That’s right.

• I will make no mistakes with acronyms and nicknames. Thank you. So, great question, Gareth. I always believe in, whatever I do, is you’ve got to compare a set of results, or what’s going to happen by discussing what happened the last time. So, let’s start there, if I may. In 2019, the ANC had its worst ever electoral performance in a national election. Despite the fact that there was this idea of a new dawn, what was called a Thuma Mina moment, with Cyril Ramaphosa this idea of Ramaphoria, the ANC fell below the 60% mark for the first time since 1994. In 2004, the ANC got 70% of the vote. This was a totally apartheid, dominated almost every facet of society in South Africa. To see the ANC fall below the 60% mark, I believe, was an existential crisis for the ANC. But, Gareth, there is an interesting pattern which has developed over the last few elections. And that is, since 2009, the ANC has declined by four percentage points in each election. So, I just told you the high watermark was 70%. So, they go to 66% in 2009, 62% in 2014, and 58% in 2019.

So, what I’m saying is, I mean, we’re seeing opinion polls, which suggest that the ANC is going to lose power, well, fall dramatically in this election. But I’ve just said that there’s a consistent pattern, a downward pattern, but very consistent of four percent in each election. So, where do the ANC find itself, the African National Congress, with two weeks out before this dramatic election we’re about to have? Let’s start off with the bad news. In Gauteng, where I think three of the, where we’re all three currently sitting, this tiny piece of land, which is 20, by far the smallest province or state or county, wherever people are signing in from, has 24% of the nation’s voters. Gareth, as you know, we and I speak about by-elections. By-elections take place in South Africa when a local representative, a councillor, dies, retires, resigns, gets fired. When I’ve looked at areas which are over 95% Black, so these are voting districts or wards, since 2021, the ANC is down 10 percentage points amongst Black voters in Gauteng.

This includes townships, informal settlements, one or two middle-class areas, and this is something which would worry the ANC greatly. I believe that this is their great concern. This is why you see a lot of the people who led the country in 1994 have been literally wheeled out in the last few days. These include people like President, former President Thabo Mbeki, who I think was brought out to energise Black middle-class voters. Today, Toko Sexwale, one of the first major figures in 1994, was campaigning in another part of the province because the ANC realises they have to do what they can to arrest the decline. That is the ANC’s first headache. The second headache is the province of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban. KwaZulu-Natal is a lot more than just Durban. This is where 21% of voters in South Africa are. So together, these two provinces are almost half of the nation’s population. And what we started seeing when Jacob Zuma, the former president from KwaZulu-Natal, left the scene under very unceremonious circumstances, he was recalled as president, and Cyril Ramaphosa, the great reformer, leads the ANC.

The ANC’s challenge, and remember I said they lost four percentage points, where did a lot of those losses come in? KwaZulu-Natal. Voters in KwaZulu-Natal did not have the enthusiasm they had for the ANC when Jacob Zuma was leading the party. So, what is happening here? Before the middle of December, and we’re going to get to the middle of December, I always feel somewhat schizophrenic in my analysis here, because there’s a before the middle of December moment and a post-middle of December moment. Before the middle of December, and in the local government elections in 2021, you saw the ANC lose support to the Inkatha Freedom Party, the party of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, a party which appeals to Zulu voters, always done well in KwaZulu-Natal, and even though their Zulu voters spread in other provinces, they’ve always underperformed there. So, this is the worry for the ANC.

Then, in the middle of December last year, we hear of the formation of a new party called uMkhonto we Sizwe. uMkhonto we Sizwe was historically the armed wing of the ANC, the military wing of the ANC. Zuma uses that name, let’s say appropriates that name, and people are saying, wow, this guy’s in his 80s, who’s he going to amass together? He got some of the people who are very close to him. And what’s interesting, Gareth, is in these by-elections, they’re normally when new parties form, they never contest by-elections before major elections. And these by-elections actually took place in IFP areas. In these IFP areas, now I want to explain, and I’m sure there’s some business people, very astute people on this call, and or business people, and astute people on this call. This, in many of these areas in KwaZulu-Natal, it’s a duopoly over the IFP, which is more dominant, but the ANC have a solid footing in some of these areas. And you saw the MK come in with a few weeks notice getting over 25 to 30% of the vote. It was a remarkable achievement.

And then you saw this again in Mpumalanga, which is where the Kruger National Park is, the Coal Belt of South Africa. They did a by-election there in a Zulu-speaking area. This is a great concern for the ANC. This is their big, this and Gauteng are their number one concerns. Gareth Cliff asked short questions, and I give long answers. I’ll try to be briefer. So I’ve just painted a very negative picture for the ANC. But what I think we underestimate at our peril, when writing the obituary for the ANC, when resigning them to the fate that they’ll fall below 45%, maybe even 40%, is what I call the rural firewall. There are large swaths of this country, which remain loyal to the African National Congress. The Democratic Alliance and the EFF have tried very hard to knock on those doors, to knock down those doors. They have failed. Let me give you a great stat. And to be honest, I think I’ve used this on one of Gareth’s other shows before. The judicial capital of South Africa is in Bloemfontein. This is a metro region.

South Africa has eight metro regions. These are the eight dominant metro where most of the population is in South Africa. In the 2021 local government elections, the midterm elections, there were two metros, only two where the ANC got over 50% of the vote. One of them is Mangaung in Bloemfontein in the Free State Province. Let me give you an astonishing fact. There is a place in Limpopo called Thohoyandou, Vendor speaking between Polokwane or formerly Petersburg and the Zimbabwe border. Now, produced good soccer teams. Besides the soccer teams, I don’t think the nation pays much attention to it. In the metro region of Bloemfontein, the ANC got just 12,000 more votes than this municipality of Thohoyandou. It is an astonishing fact. Thohoyandou was the only municipality in the country where the ANC got over 90% of the vote in 2019. This rural firewall, which includes areas around Sun City, the platinum belt of South Africa, seems resolute.

It includes the Eastern Cape, the province which gave the ANC and the nation, Nelson Mandela, Walter Susulu, Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, all these large iconic figures. The ANC support, Gareth and Phumi, seems absolutely resolute there. Now, let me just give you, I’ve given the ANC some hope. Just one critical question, and I’m sure we’re going to speak about this and I’m going to keep quiet because I know there are many good questions coming. Turnout. I think fundamentally this election is about turnout versus turning on. What do I mean by that? I’ve just told you that in many rural parts of the country, despite there being so many new entrants in the election this time, parties are battling to turn on voters who voted for the ANC in the past and or sat out the last election.

The ANC’s number one challenge in the next two weeks is places like Thohoyandou, places like Mthatha, places like Rustenburg, places where there are former homelands. Can they turn those voters out? Because Gareth and Phumi, in many of these places, the ANC is getting 80 percent plus, 85 percent, 90 percent in Thohoyandou. But when we look at turnout, that is far lower in those rural areas than it is in places like Johannesburg where the three of us sit tonight. So I’m going to keep quiet there.

• That’s a lot of statistics you’ve thrown at us, Wayne.

• Sorry, too many.

• No, no, they’re perfect. And I think the first place that I would like to ask about, and we’ve got some questions that have come in the chat as well, is around the turnout and the numbers, absolute numbers of people who show up. Because one of the things that you didn’t talk about is even though the ANC has been declining in terms of the number of people voting for them, the number of people showing up to vote has also been declining, right? And we are now sitting, and why this election is so critical, I think, is we are sitting at a place where for the first time, in terms of the number of people registered to vote, because we’re not going to talk about the eligible ones, there is a large number of young people who have only ever known the ANC, who don’t know Apartheid, who don’t know the old story of what happened before. They have only known the ANC over these past 18 years of their lives at least, minimum, or 27 years of their life, which is the median age in this country. And Gareth, please jump in here before Wayne answers, because you told me an astonishing statistic in terms of the number of people registered to vote by age. So in that 18 to 25 block versus the 65 to 100. What do you think?

• Well, I mean, it’s a frightening reality that people talk about how in the U.S., for example, it’s hard to get the vote out among young people. In South Africa, Wayne will know this because he pays attention to these things, but the IEC has released all the data on the registered voters. There are only 500 and something thousand people aged 18 to 21 who will be registered to vote in this election. Now that is in complete disproportion to what our population looks like. Our population is young. Most of the young people in this country are the ones who are most threatened by unemployment. You would think they had the most dogs in this fight. You’d think that they had the most reason to go to the polls. Less than half a million of the 27 million registered people to vote are in that 18 to 21 age bracket, which is, I mean, it’s just as big as belief.

It shows you, first of all, that these people are not being spoken to, or they’re not hearing the messaging that’s being spoken to them, or that they’re so completely apathetic that they’ve opted out of the system permanently. So, they’re just paying no attention. It’s like wallpaper to them. One of those must be true. There are probably other interpretations as well. The ironic thing is that people between 80 and 100, which is, I mean, these are people in a substantially old demographic category, 80 to 100. We’re not talking about people who are still in the workplace necessarily. We have more of those registered than we have 18 to 21-year-olds, by about 100,000. Am I right, Wayne?

• Yeah.

• Yeah, that’s correct. And another way of skinning the cat is that if you look at election to election, just to amplify the point Gareth’s made, in 2009, the voters’ roll grew by about 13, 14%. In 2014, it grew by 10%. In 2019, it grew by 5.5%. In this election, only 3.5%. That only means very few young people, exactly what Gareth said, showed up and registered and bothered to register to vote. This is concerning. And then again, I think this favours incumbents, larger incumbents like the ANC and the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition in this election. So just for me on turnout, now, if I had to watch the glorious Johannesburg sunset, which has set, and I could ponder a great question, turnout would be one of them. So, I would say that certainly for the ANC, there will be less enthusiasm this time than last time, all things being equal, except one thing, which I’m going to get to now.

Because again, people are enthusiastic about Cyril Ramaphosa pausing in 2019. You look at the results in places like Sandton, the ANC did well there on national ballots compared to the provincial ballots. I know a number of people who voted for Cyril Ramaphosa, who hadn’t voted for the ANC before. That’s the first thing. But the million-dollar question is KwaZulu-Natal and the MK party, the uMkhonto we Sizwe party, formed by Jacob Zuma. Is this going to energise people who sat out the last election? Does this mean that the ANC has pulled up its socks, that they realise that even though they use the word, siyanqoba, which means victory is certain, I think, Phumi, that’s the translation. I’ve since sensed that the ANC is taking this election very seriously. And because of the contestation in KwaZulu-Natal, turnout might not be as low as we expect. I’m going to just, I have it at about 63% now, I think will be the turnout, but maybe I’ll eat my hat the day after the election.

• I think that Jacob Zuma factor is what is going to drive turnout, particularly in KZN, in the KwaZulu-Natal area. I do think that people, and I want us to talk a little bit about the way the opposition is viewed in this country. People would rather not show up and vote, than vote for the opposition. So that’s why the turnout has gone down over the years. So the disillusionment with the ANC has been for quite a while, you know, it’s not the first time. And the Umkhonto we Sizwe party is not the first breakaway out of the ANC. If I think about 2019, and the year, and the one before that, the national election before that, we had the EFF, what? Economic Freedom Fighters.

• Economic Freedom Fighters.

• Economic Freedom Fighters, EFF, were a breakaway from the ANC.

• Well, before that, we had Umkhonto we Sizwe, we had COPE, yeah, all of them.

• Yeah. And when you look at the absolute numbers, those breakaways do eat into the ANC vote. But coupled with the low turnout, I think that’s one of the reasons that that decline of the ANC has looked the way that it does. But what is the reason that the opposition does not win from the apathy of voters? Why are the opposition unable to pick up those votes?

• Great question. So when those who are watching from South Africa or those voting overseas are going to step into the ballot box, you’re going to see a ballot paper like no other. I’m not even going to go into the three ballots, but the national ballot will have two columns. It’s going to be thick and chunky. It’s going to take time to fold. We’re going to have to all practise before we go to the ballot. This means that there are more parties running than ever. It’s over 50. You’ve got people who are going to try to do what the DA, the Democratic Alliance Official Opposition, the EFF, and the Inkatha Freedom Party have failed in the last few elections, and that is to get those who choose to stay away to give these voters a chance. So, I think what’s been happening is that there are two subplots of the last 2019 elections, the last 2021 elections. In 2019, the big winner in the election was the radical economic freedom fighters, which as you and Gareth alluded to is an ANC breakaway party. It’s more radical. They almost doubled their support, and a lot of that was to do with KwaZulu-Natal.

But what’s often important when we analyse anything in life is what’s the second story? The second story in the 2019 elections was a retreat into familiarity. What do I mean by that? You saw white Afrikaners leave the DA for the Freedom Front Plus. This is a party which does have some coloured South Africans in its leadership, but extensively appeals to white Afrikaans voters. Why? Because it looks like us, it speaks like us, and it understands us. It’s more relatable. On that same level was the Inkatha Freedom Party, which Jacob Zuma whipped six loves, six love to use a tennis metaphor. When he was president of the ANC, they made a comeback. And there’s a reason why I’m speaking about this, Phumi. It showed again, Zulu voters said the ANC no longer represents us. What represents us is someone who looks like us, speaks like us, and understands our issues. We saw this theme continue in 2021 with the emergence of Gayton McKenzie’s Patriotic Alliance, a coloured nationalist party. That more and more South Africans are saying, if we’re not going to vote for the ANC or the DA, we’re going to vote for someone who looks like us, speaks like us.

And I think this is a very interesting theme in our politics. And something to watch in this election, are we going to see some South Africans who voted for the ANC in the past vote for a more of a local party, which isn’t being taken seriously, not being spoken about much in the media, because again, it speaks to who they are, and what their core issues are. So I just think, again, we can criticise opposition parties all we want, but to tackle the behemoth of the ANC is easier said than done. I mean, the DA, the DP, the Democratic Alliance had grown in every election. They tried to grow in the last election, tried to appeal to a wide section of voters, they went backwards. And I’m sure that the EFF in this election, and I don’t want to get ahead of myself, there’s a strong scenario that they’re going to go backwards. So I think it’s easier said than done. The ANC is a behemoth, certainly in rural areas, and it’s very hard to change those hearts and minds.

• Okay, so if all the things that you’ve already said come to pass in either lesser or greater form than you predict, and I know this is a tough business, because you’re expected to be Nostradamus, but don’t worry, we’re not going to call you up the day after the election and say, you were wrong, Wayne, we’re never going to talk to you again, because there is a huge amount of randomness that comes into these equations. Who of the opposition parties does stand, besides MK, who we’ve addressed, does stand to win considerably, or even just to go up nominally at this point?

Because there’s also the novelty factor for some of them. You know, they’re all talking a big game. Phumi and I have interviewed the leaders of all of these parties over the past few weeks, and we’ll be putting together a little package in, you know, not next week, but the week after, for everybody on lockdown to watch as well. They all say they’re going to get 5%, 10%, 15%. Some of them are claiming upwards of 25%, 30%. I mean, if you believed any of that, we’d have to have 500% to share around, because it’s just impossible. The maths just doesn’t work. So who do you think really credibly has a chance to grow?

• Yeah, so again, go back. If I were doing this presentation in November last year, I’d say the winner of the election, the big winner in the election will be the Inkatha Freedom Party. And again, what Gareth’s saying, this is unlike maybe European election, where a new entrant can come in and just smash the ball out of the park and get 15% or 20%. That’s very unlikely in a South African election. We’re quite brand conservative. So I would have said the IFP, Gareth. Today, two weeks out before the election, we’ve spoken about MK. The other one is Gayton McKenzie’s Patriotic Alliance.

And this is the continuation of the theme that these parties are a lot, they might be speaking about xenophobia, the Patriotic Alliance have a very strong position on illegal immigration. I don’t think that’s what’s winning them the votes. What’s winning them the votes is the ability to represent a community, which maybe no longer feels represented by the DA. And MK is not just about anti ANC, it’s about Zulu identity. It’s about the Jacob Zuma when he sings Zulu songs, or dress and wear Zulu attire. He does it in a far more impressive fashion than the current ANC leadership and the IFP leadership. So Gareth, I think it’s going to be about identity. A party which I think squandered just okay, yes, Phumi.

• But I do want to say that the thing also about Jacob Zuma and the IFP and KwaZulu-Natal, which I don’t think we’ve spent enough time talking about even here in South Africa, is really the fact that why KwaZulu-Natal is such a battleground right now, is because there has been two major events as well that have happened. The IFP lost its longtime leader, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who was also very much a leader within the community of KwaZulu-Natal. So people listened, followed where he led, and so he was an authority figure.

The Zulu monarch passed away, and we have a new monarch who’s still very shaky, who still is struggling with some succession issues within the family, who hasn’t asserted himself in that province within the nation as well. So, the loss of authority figures there is what Jacob Zuma has stepped into, and that is what he is also capitalising on. And the ANC, unfortunately, even historically, I mean KZN even in the first election, you know, that is where they didn’t win. That was an IFP-led province for a very long time. The ANC’s winning in KZN is very tied to Jacob Zuma, and I think all of that social factor around what’s happening in KwaZulu-Natal today also plays a role in why Jacob Zuma has been able to make such a strong appearance in that province.

• Correct, it’s a true point. And the decline of the ANC, I mean their current leadership in the province isn’t what it was, the weakest it’s ever been. That’s another major institution. So these major KZN institutions, which are facing great pressure, are not what they once were, it does allow MK to flourish. Gareth, a party I haven’t mentioned is Action SA. Now they, I’ve spoken about the top major Talking about about 2019 being the Economic Freedom Fighters Action Essay formed by Herman Mashaba, a business person, you some of you might know the product Black Like Me, mayor of Johannesburg. After the 2021 local government elections, he was the talking point. And I mean, I’ve been looking at the data, Gareth, quite remarkable. You go to places like Protea Glen in Soweto, getting 28-29% to the vote.

I like throwing out statistics. I like showing off in all but one ward in Soweto in 2021, ActionSA beat the Economic Freedom Fighters, which had a base in Soweto. So and then in white suburbs, particularly in the south of Johannesburg, places like Bosonia, places like Glen Vista, some of you might remember, ActionSA did very well. I really thought that they’d use the positive momentum from 2021 and be a major play in this election. That has not turned out to be. And again, it’s one thing doing well in an election. And this is where I give credit to parties like the ANC, the Democratic Alliance, the Inkatha Freedom Party, the Freedom Front, EFF, they’ve done these rodeos before. Just seeing as one thing doing well in a local government election, they just haven’t taken the country by storm on a national level. So Gareth, the two parties which I’m expecting to do far better than their current position are MK and the Patriotic Alliance.

• Wayne, there’s a question here, and I would like you to talk a little bit about it, is we have three ballots coming up, because for the first time in this election, we have independents also vying for positions. So everybody gets three ballots. You get a national ballot, which is the party that you’re sending to parliament, who gets to vote for who becomes the president. We have got a provincial ballot, which is more regional. And then we’ve got a ballot, which is regional, but for independents. We also have… Yes, Wayne?

• No, I finished, then I’ll come in.

• Okay. We also have a very low level of education in this country, confusing ballots. And we haven’t had, the IEC has not had the kind of budgets that it’s had in previous years to do training, to tell people how to use the ballot, how to vote, what to do when they’re in the box. Do you think this is going to be a factor, spoiled ballots?

• Thank you. Thank you for the question. So I just want to, you get 95 out of 100 for that explanation. The regional ballots, so independents are allowed to run in this election. There’s someone very prominent in the Western Cape called Zaki Ahmad, who founded the Treatment Action Campaign, very prominent social activist, who was running for parliament in 2006. He’d have a much greater chance now. But I think the independents is something media has spoken about, which is going to be just not spoken much about on the 30th of May, the day of the election. It’s not really, so they’re going to not do well independents. And I can go into that later if people want why. But the idea of the third ballot was also to ensure regional representation. So we have 400 seats in parliament, unlike some, similar to a country like Israel, similar to other countries in Europe, there are a list system.

So, i.e. you’re not voting for a constituency, you’re not voting for a representative in a certain area. So the idea behind the regional ballot is, okay, there’s still 400 seats in parliament, whereas in the last election, your national ballot when determined who those 400 people were. In this election, you’re still electing 400 people, the national ballot goes to 200 people who are on a list. And then we’re all sitting in Gauteng, where I think it’s 47 or 48 out of the 200. It’s designed to ensure regional representativity. So I come from the great town of Freiburg in the northwest, I’m two hours, about an hour from the Northern Cape border. The Northern Cape is the largest province in this land, but very few people. It only gets five out of 200.

So but at least the Northern Cape knows that there’ll be five members of parliament who will be able to represent, who will represent that party in parliament. So it’s designed to ensure greater regional representativity. But ultimately, you’ll still be representing your party, you represent your party before your province. And secondly, it allows the independents to run on those regional ballots. But again, we speaking too much about them, it’s not going to be a major feature of the selection. Okay.

• I’m sorry about that, because Phumi and I are going to be speaking to Zaki Ahmad tomorrow. Might as well just cancel him, right, Phumi?

• No way! Zaki and Anneli, I totally want to talk to those two. I’m going to have a ball. I can’t wait.

• Zaki will do the best. I think he has the best chance.

• He will. Okay.

• He will. It’s a very good question here from Monty, who says, will there be, I mean, it seems like a crazy question, but I mean, even in America, they’ve had to deal with this. Will there be a peaceful transfer of power in South Africa if the ANC loses in the upcoming election? How robust is the state? If something had to happen and the ANC found themselves below 50, would there be carnage? Would everything go up in flames?

• Great question, Monty. So, in 2009, the ANC lost power in the Western Cape. There was a free transfer of power. I remember, by the way, the first major transfer of power was in the city of Cape Town. And I remember, and I don’t want to, the Minister of Local Government, who was then in the ANC, like, in a way, tried to pass legislation or determination which would have affected the way that government worked. But, ostensibly, there was that free transfer of power in the city of Cape Town. In 2009, the province of the Western Cape had a transfer of power. In 2016, in local government elections, the ANC lost control of Johannesburg, the capital city, which is called Tshwane, Pretoria, the East Rand, Ekurhuleni, OR Tambo Airport, where OR Tambo Airport is.

So, wherever we’ve seen in major areas, the ruling party lose power, there has been a free transfer of power. However, it hasn’t always been plain sailing. And I can take you to rural examples, where in rural councils, where there’s not a lot of media and not a lot of scrutiny, and where the stakes with respect to those places, which I love dearly, there has been, like, you have seen councils being locked out of chambers, you have seen a delay in power. But, ultimately, there has been a transfer of power. However, the stakes are far higher this time. I believe, the election will be free and fair. And I would like to believe, judging on the past data, the past experience I’ve given you, that there will be a free transfer of power, but obviously, this time, the stakes are higher.

• I still, I will put my little finger on a block and say, I don’t think there’s going to be a need for a transfer of power, because I think the ANC, even though people are, like, high-fiving themselves and telling each other that they’re going to win this election, or there’s going to be a coalition, I don’t think it will get there. I think the ANC will still get a 50-plus something, not even 50 plus one, 50 plus something significant.

• If that’s the case, sorry, Wayne, if that is the case, then it’s just more of the same for the next five years, right? So then, this has not been a remarkable election at all, because nothing has already happened. Yeah, look, the President signed the National Health Insurance Bill today, which is dominating the conversation on television, on social media, around the dinner tables. The job data was released yesterday, which, by the way, in America is a major contributor to an election outcome, can be in a close election. The nation’s not speaking about this today. The nation has not spoken about issues. They haven’t been serious.

We’re not discussing economic growth. We’re not discussing how to turn around the industrial heartlands of this country, of how to deal with the highest youth unemployment rate in the world. And this is very sad for me to observe, because I think political parties should be put through their paces. Yes, I understand for some, the burning of the flag, the computer-generated flag was hurtful. But the nation discussed this for a week, whereas crime should be a burgeoning issue. I thought crime would loom large in this election. It hasn’t loomed large. So I think the fact that we haven’t discussed core issues is going to help the ANC somewhat on election day. Wayne, I beg to differ. I don’t know if the issue of the CGI burning flag was topical in the nation as much as it was on social media and in dinner tables. I think that we also have a dichotomy here in South Africa, where we have a very loud voice on social media, which only has about 4 million people, 4 million users.

And it distorts how people are looking at and seeing what is actually happening on the ground. That’s why their polling is going to be wrong. Because I think people are worried about the economy, about the cost of living, about jobs, about safety, which is why people like Gayton and the Patriotic Alliance have been able to make such inroads, because that’s all he talks about. And he has created a scapegoat in his particular party and his campaign, in that he’s talked about foreigners being the people who steal your job, who steal from you physically, and bring drugs into your communities, all the issues that people actually on the ground are worried about. He is talking about it, and that’s why he’s getting this kind of traction. But on social media, and in the news even, there’s this big domination around irrelevant things like a CGI flag burning.

• Yeah, and not proper discussion about the jobs numbers. I live in South Africa, I see my future in South Africa, those numbers were startling for me yesterday. And we need to be having debates and discussions about this. Parties need to put their manifestos to the test. Because so yeah, Gareth, if it’s not more of the same, it might be slightly more of the same, i.e. if the ANC falls below 50%, you’re not going to see John Steenhuisen, the leader of the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition as the Minister of Housing, you’re not going to see Floyd Shivambu, the number two in the economic freedom fighters, fulfil his lifelong dream of becoming the Minister of Finance. The ANC will co-opt smaller parties, which have been loyal to the party in the last five years, just a real anomaly. This is a global anomaly.

Let me just go off on a quick tangent. We are, the three of us are currently sitting in the city of Johannesburg, the economic powerhouse of the country, where so many businesses which are in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are based, where most people are based, 24% of voters, as I say, by far the most populous population. The mayor of this great city of Johannesburg comes from a party which got less than 1% of the vote in the local government elections. This is a very serious position. And the city has major challenges such as water shedding, Eskom, load shedding is abated, but there’s still electricity challenges in Johannesburg, infrastructure collapse. Some of you on the call today on the Zoom session might know what was once called Devil’s Dorp because of a Showmax documentary, the great town of Kruger’s Dorp in the West Rand.

Over there, there’s a party which literally has one seat in the legislature, which has the mayorship. Why am I talking about this? Is the ANC in many municipalities, certainly in Gauteng, have rewarded small parties with the mayorship. The election comes around and the ANC gets 48, 49%. They’ll remind those parties and say, look, we gave you the mayorship of Johannesburg. You’ll now accept the Deputy Minister of Tourism and get your ministerial car and you’re not going to rock the boat. We helped you. You’re going to help us. I think that’s a very likely scenario, Gareth and Phumi, if the ANC falls just below 50%.

• Well, that’s a good place, Wayne, to bring in a question from Patricia Fine, who’s asking about percentages. How many votes one needs to actually get a seat in parliament?

• It’s a good question. In 2019, Al Jama-ah, the Muslim party, the party which has the mayorship in Johannesburg, got in. It’s quite easy. Let’s just take a step back. There’s a formula, but there are 400 seats in parliament, which ostensibly means you need 0.25% to get a seat in parliament. Al Jama-ah got in because there were so many parties in the ballot and there was a remainder. There’s not an equal distribution of the votes. Only got 0.18% of the votes, 31,000 votes. So, I would think around, and again, I might be wrong, 38,000 votes might get you a seat in parliament. Now, do you want me to do percentages of what I think the parties will get? Okay. We’re ready at that stage. I’ve been having fun.

Look, it’s quarter to seven in our time, okay. So, I’m going to give you a very unsatisfactory question. You’re going to get written complaints after this, but because of MK, we just do not know how this uMkhonto weSizwe party. I think this is a very hard election to predict. In the last election, we all knew that the ANC would fit between a range of 3%, the DA, a range of 2%, the EFF, a range of 2%. I’m going to disappoint you now greatly. I think because we just do not know what MK is going to do in KwaZulu-Natal and in Gauteng. I think people forget how many townships in Gauteng where Zulu is the dominant language. I think we forget that in the Coal Belt, the province which blesses us with the Kruger National Park and many other natural wonders like God’s Window and the Borkslag Potholes and Mpumalanga has also a lot of Zulu speakers.

• 12 million Zulu speakers in the country. 12 million Zulu speakers.

• 12 million. It is an astonishing fact.

• 12 out of 60.

• I’m Zulu.

• It is vital. So Phumi, can MK, like some of the opinion polls have had them on 14%, I’m saying can they get to 9%? If they can get to 8-9%, the ANC can fall to 46% in this election. Now, I’m far more conservative than other people who might have spoken before in lockdown university. I’ve never seen the ANC get to 40%. I just remember there’s been a steady predictable decline in the last elections. We’re saying it’s going to be more pronounced than that this time. Can the ANC get to 52%? They can. So what I’m saying is that steady decline of 4 percentage points will be more exaggerated this time around because the EFF are still a factor. The EFF might decline a percent and that’s a very interesting scenario, Gareth, going forward in our country if the president waiting, Julius Malema’s party declines in this election.

So the scenario of 52% means that MK implodes in the next two weeks and that’s not impossible. The party’s going through a very tough time right now. And rural voters come out and vote and say, look, we have to vote for the ANC this time around. The Democratic Alliance by quite some distance will remain the official opposition. Can they? So in the 2014 election, they got 22% of the vote. In the last election, they got 21% of the vote. Can they get to match what they do last time? I think it’s difficult and I’ll tell you why it’s difficult and Phumi is using some strong cues there, but let me tell you why it will be difficult. I think the DA will win back some Afrikaans voters and some English-speaking white voters. I think the DA is going to hoover up the Indian vote, the Hindu-Indian vote, which is very large in KwaZulu-Natal.

Why are they going to do this? Because KwaZulu-Natal, certainly Durban, I don’t know when last people were there, has been beset by great service delivery challenges. This extends to Pietermaritzburg, the provincial capital. We’re also there. That municipality has been beset by great challenges. And ironically, in the Indian community, which were the godfathers of giving us parties which purported to represent that community only parties, like you might have remembered the man who said, I’ll double cross that bridge when I come to it, Amichand Rajbanzi, his party’s not on the ballot in this election. So I think the DA is going to grow there. Yes, so he passed away, but his wife took over. I think the DA will lose votes amongst black voters in six out of the nine provinces. They might grow in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State, but what’s the DA’s biggest concern right now?

Many pundits will say it’s Gaza. It’s not Gaza. It’s something else which begins with a G. It’s Gayton. Gayton McKenzie and the Patriotic Alliance. Remember, I said that they’re going to be the winner in this election. By the way, let me just go off on a quick tangent. Gayton McKenzie, remember, the ANC gets a lot of coloured voters in rural areas like the Northern Cape where Kimberley is, but also in places like Oudtshoorn, and places like Oudtshoorn is a good example where historically they’ve done well. This has been the backbone of the townships in the Western Cape and these rural coloured voters. The ANC is under threat there as well. So, Gayton’s giving them a headache as well. So because of the DA’s challenge with coloured voters, that’s why I think they’ll go backwards in this election. Okay, so the EFF. So this is a fascinating scenario. Let me just wrap it all in one. I think I’ve depressed people.

For those who are worried about the ANC, for those who don’t like the EFF, here’s an interesting scenario I want you to think about. ANC falls to 46% and, but MK does well. They’re able to hold it together for the next two weeks. And Zuma’s corrals the volunteers. He corrals that enthusiasm. We have registration weekends, we register to vote. There was tremendous enthusiasm and a brilliant ground game, volunteer effort. He’s able to do it one more time, this 82-year-old man, and MK becomes the fourth largest party in the election. But in turn, don’t only take ANC and IFP votes, but also EFF votes. Julius Malema, the big thing of the 2019 election goes backwards in that election. What will that mean for the future of the EFF? A populist party, the president awaiting going backwards. Let me give you the scenario. Let’s just fast forward to 2029. The ANC has the existential crisis of 46%.

By the way, the DA also has an existential crisis, they go backwards to the second election in a row. The EFF now has an existential crisis. And before South Africa wins the Rugby World Cup again, long before that, MK implodes. MK will not last long after this election. Zuma is 82 years old. They will not be on the ballots, or there will be a shadow of their former self there on the ballot next time. But Zuma won’t be on the ballot next time around. This is a fascinating time for our politics. Okay, so just very quickly, I said MK is really hard to predict, five to up to 9%. Sorry, I’m really copping out here. And then it’ll be the IFP and then ActionSA and the Patriotic Alliance contesting. There are some small interesting parties that are doing well on social media, they’re not going to do so well.

• I want to ask about Al Jama-ah, because the Gaza surge has really been something that I think we didn’t contend with going into this election. Al Jama-ah is the only stated Muslim party that is represented, right? I don’t think there’s another one in the Western Cape. The Western Cape has quite a big Muslim community, and has seen over with ICJ and South Africa and the ANC stance with Israel and Palestine. And the corner that the DA have been forced into with regard to Israel and Palestine, how do you think their chances, and because of the Johannesburg mayorship, they really have become a player in the minds of the people who are listening to the news, who are watching what’s happening. What do you think Al Jama-ah’s chances are going to be going into this election?

• Thank you Phumi. So often when I speak about the EFF, people say is Wayne a communist, is he a radical? I’d like to think, and I don’t want to blow my own trumpet, that I’m quite objective. That I can take a step back, even if I don’t agree with something, and say that’s a good campaign, that’s a good speech, etc. With respect to Al-Jamal, I saw their leader recently. Look, they snuck into parliament the last time. I think you’ve put a good case as to why they might benefit, because they are the largest Muslim party. But their leadership, their bench is very, very weak. I mean, the former mayor had to leave from Al Jama-ah, I mean, his own party to force him out. The new mayor is not much better. The leader of Al Jama-ah really doesn’t inspire confidence. I mean, you hear him speak, like I’m an Englishman, my Zulu is not good, but I can watch Jacob Zuma and say, wow, this guy has the crowd eating out of his hand.

You do not see that when the leader of Al Jama-ah speaks. What’s interesting, if you go past Houthi Mosque, there’s another party running called Sizwe Ummah Nation. In the Western Cape, and I don’t want to get too granular, I’ve been very disciplined. But there are a number, like the former deputy foreign minister, the former leader of the ANC in the Western Cape, he’s formed his own party, stridently anti-Israel. So what you might see is a spraying of the vote in many directions. Let’s also see what Naledi Pandor and the ANC do in the last two weeks, how motivated they are on this matter. But let me give you something else now. Earlier I spoke about the National Health Insurance Bill, which I think you and Gareth can explain much better than I can. If you’re a middle class Muslim person, of which it’s a large sect of the Muslim community, and today you’re hearing the president, first of all, be very critical about middle class people who have medical aid and private healthcare, saying like, I can’t remember his exact words, saying that they’re ungrateful, etcetera. about this, they don’t understand about this.

I believe that there are many middle class Muslims who might care deeply about the Palestinians, but might also say, you know what, I want to go to my doctor of choice. I don’t want to be told which medical aid. So I think middle class Muslims care about the economy, they care about job opportunities for their kids, they care about the rising crime rates. So yes, it’s a dominant issue on social media and within the Muslim community. But I think just like other middle class communities, there will be many things go through their mind when they vote. And maybe Al Jama-ah benefits somewhat, but I don’t think much.

• So there’s one more question. We’ve got three minutes to go. And we’ve been very good, Wayne, you’ve been outstanding, concise with your answers.

• [Wayne] I’ll try,

• But this question is around funding for the election. Running an election is an expensive exercise. The ANC has been in the news about basically being broke. But there’s also been a conversation around where they have gotten the money to run the campaign that they are currently running. I think I read something in Arab World about Saudi Arabia promising to give them money if they drop the ICJ case. Can you talk a little bit about the funding for the ANC and various parties?

• Right, so we have funding. You have to disclose if you give a party more than 100,000 rand, which is just over $5,000. You have to disclose that. But let’s take the economic freedom fighters before we talk about the ANC. They and I’m sure Gareth and Phumi spoke a lot about this in their show. When they had their 10th anniversary launch, it was a remarkable theatre. They have never declared who their donors are. And you can’t tell me that it’s just good people who are giving the EFF around the country 99,000 rand or more. So the EFF don’t give a toss. They don’t give a damn about this legislation. The ANC have released their donors. And there’s this Viktor Vekselberg, this Russian oligarch, who I think is in South Africa, who has Jewish links, I think.

He’s a miner, not a young person, an actual miner. So we hear stories about Iran. I haven’t seen conclusive proof. It could be true. We hear stories about Russia. It could very well be true. Certainly, China. But if you don’t declare it, it’s very hard for me to dedicate the hours to go into that kind of research. But let me just tell you one interesting thing I’ve found out, is that on social media, and again, I think we as society, as young and old, pay way too much attention, spend too much time on social media. We should be listening more to Gareth and watching more of Lockdown University, reading more books and spending time on social media. One thing I’ve noticed is Russian bots have transferred their allegiance from the EFF to the MK party. So I do think Zuma is getting money from the Russians.

But one of the things I hear when I speak to his people, and I’m watching the time, I’m almost at 20 more seconds, is that he’s broke. So the ANC is getting its money from somewhere overseas. But also remember, that it wasn’t just Jacob Zuma who relied on tenderpreneurs in KwaZulu-Natal, Free States in Northwest to lead the AMC and to extend the patronage network. There’s certainly Cyril Ramaphosa. I hope I’m answering that question satisfactory. I hope so too. It was a question from the, it was a question from the panel and to close, I think before I hand over back to Gareth, Gareth, you’ve been very quiet.

• I’m listening to Wayne with great interest because this is, is a very good contrast. And I remember we both spoke to Wayne sort of at the beginning of campaign season. A lot has changed since then. And he’s kept abreast of all these changes. And it’s just, it’s curious to me to watch where the movements are or are not happening. And there’s an enormous amount of entropy in the system. It’s like, it’s heavy. I think you would be, you’d be a fool to make wild and dangerous predictions like the political parties themselves are, although from them, it’s just propaganda. I think that what Wayne’s telling us is, you know, if you were expecting everything to change dramatically, don’t hold your breath.

• I think it is. We’re going to be stuck with the lame duck president as the Americans call a second term. But Wayne, you have been scintillating. Thank you very much. And I don’t, it’s not just me because I have a crush on you, but Rita in the comments, which is going to be the last comment I’m going to read to you, says absolutely illuminating, including the social, political, economic impact of the election. Many thanks from one who resides on a different continent. So if you were needing any validation this evening, Wayne, you have been amazing. Absolutely illuminating. Thank you for sharing your hour with us. Thank you for sharing your mind and all the information therein.

• [Wayne] Thank you so much.

• And because of all the punting for our podcast, which is called Burning Platform and for Lockdown, I think we’ll invite you again. You were a good guest.

• Thanks so much.

• Absolutely, thank you so much, Wayne, first of all, for your insights and Phumi, thank you for steering it in the most interesting directions. Ladies and gentlemen, we will return with more of this and hopefully even closer, clearer, more direct and dramatic results just before the elections. An idea of what MK might be doing. I love Wayne’s suggestion that it might all fall apart in the next two weeks.

• Oh, can I just say-

• Of course.

• Can I just say this is my punt for tomorrow’s session in the South Africa series. We’re talking about the national anthem, Nkosi sikelel’ Afrika and how an Afrikaans poem and a xhosa hymn became a mash-up to create what we now have as our rallying cry before we win the Rugby World Cup.

• Absolutely. Well, listen, there’s going to be a whole lot more. We will update you as new information comes in. But Wayne, thank you for your time. Thank you, Phumi, and most especially thank you to you for joining us this evening. We will be back with more on Lockdown University.